Applied Cybernetics Group
Threat intel → detection pipeline
Tuesday, July 14, 2026
Data as of 20:11 UTC
Technique
T1555.001
Tactics
Credential Access
MISP citations
0
KEV CVEs mapped
0
Community rules
1
thrunt rules
0
Active families
AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer)
Upstream
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/001

MITRE description

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>, <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann) Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>security dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain credentials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</code>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</code> file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt)

Detection coverage

SigmaHQ community rules

Signal counts reflect the current corpus snapshot: MISP citations are regex-extracted from CIRCL OSINT event text and galaxy tags; KEV mappings come from MITRE CTID; community coverage is the SigmaHQ rule inventory (core, emerging-threats, threat-hunting collections) at release r2026-07-01. Rule bodies are not mirrored — links go upstream.